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Abstract 
Illusory control refers to an effect in games of chance where features associated with skilful 
situations increase expectancies of success. Past work has operationalised illusory control in 
terms of subjective ratings or behaviour, with limited consideration of the relationship 
between these definitions, or the broader construct of agency. This study used a novel card-
guessing task in 78 participants to investigate the relationship between subjective and 
behavioural illusory control. We compared trials in which participants (i) had no opportunity 
to exercise illusory control, (ii) could exercise illusory control for free, or (iii) could pay to 
exercise illusory control. Contingency Judgment and Intentional Binding tasks assessed 
explicit and implicit sense of agency, respectively. On the card-guessing task, confidence was 
higher when participants exerted control relative to the baseline condition. In a 
complementary model, participants were more likely to exercise control when their 
confidence was high, and this effect was accentuated in the pay condition relative to the free 
condition. Decisions to pay were positively correlated with control ratings on the 
Contingency Judgment task, but were not significantly related to Intentional Binding. These 
results establish an association between subjective and behavioural illusory control, and 
locate the construct within the cognitive literature on agency. 
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Let Me Take The Wheel: Illusory Control and Sense of Agency 
Under conditions of chance, including many forms of gambling, humans often over-
estimate their level of control or skill. In Langer’s (1975) famous experiments introducing the 
‘illusion of control’, participants who had the opportunity to choose a lottery ticket requested 
a higher price for selling back the ticket than participants who did not have this opportunity 
to choose (mean selling prices: $8.67 vs $1.96, respectively). According to Langer (1975), 
this inappropriate expectation of success (termed illusory control) arises when games of 
chance employ features that are typically associated with skilful situations. As well as a 
choice (in the lottery experiments), the opportunity for instrumental action can be a potent 
means of eliciting illusory control. For example, in a field study of craps players, players 
were more likely to bet and placed higher bets when they were personally throwing 
(‘shooting’) the dice, compared to their behaviour during other players’ throws (Davis, 
Sundahl, & Lesbo, 2000). Similarly, in a laboratory study of roulette, participants placed 
higher bets in a condition where they threw the roulette ball onto the wheel, compared to 
when a croupier threw the ball (Ladouceur & Mayrand, 1987).  
Despite some provocative demonstrations of illusory control, and a widespread 
recognition that the construct is relevant to gambling policy and the treatment of problem 
gambling (Fortune & Goodie, 2012; Griffiths, 1993; Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005), there is 
still much that is unclear about the cognitive underpinnings of illusory control. The 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 4
conventional definition by Langer (1975) refers to a judgment effect, that the perceived 
likelihood of winning (“the expectancy of a personal success probability”, p. 311) is altered 
by some kind of personal involvement. However, a host of complementary (but 
psychologically distinct) factors may also contribute to these effects. The reluctance to 
exchange lottery tickets may be linked to magical beliefs about ‘tempting fate’ (Risen & 
Gilovich, 2007) or an increased ‘ownership effect’ (i.e. enhanced value attached to personal 
possessions; Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007; Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2002). 
Participants may derive greater reward utility from outcomes that arise from their own 
behaviour, compared to non-contingent outcomes (e.g. Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Tricomi, 
Delgado, & Fiez, 2004). An over-estimation effect under conditions of low control may also 
reflect a more general difficulty in discerning the level of control, such that participants 
similarly under-estimate their degree of control when control is actually high (Gino, Sharek, 
& Moore, 2011; see also Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998). 
Arbitrating between these various mechanisms has been hampered in part by 
differences in how studies have operationalised illusory control. Although Langer’s (1975) 
original studies measured pricing decisions, most subsequent studies have relied upon 
subjective ratings as the primary dependent variable; either of ‘confidence in winning’ or 
‘perceived control’ (see Presson & Benassi, 1996; Stefan & David, 2013). Ratings offer a 
quick means for quantifying illusory control perceptions, but these estimates tend to be taken 
after (rather than during) the task, and can therefore be prone to demand characteristics and 
memory biases (Presson & Benassi, 1996; Ejova, Navarro, & Delfabbro, 2013). Moreover, 
reporting higher confidence in a given condition does not convincingly show that the 
participant is under an illusion. For a compelling demonstration of a psychological ‘illusion’, 
participants should be willing to actively disadvantage themselves (e.g. by paying a cost) in 
order to gain or exercise control in a chance situation.  
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 5
Fewer studies on illusory control have employed behavioural measures (see Stefan & 
David, 2013). Of those that have, some have used relatively ‘soft’ measures that suffer from 
similar limitations to subjective ratings. For example, one procedure involves a dice-throwing 
game where rolling a six wins a prize. Participants are given the choice between throwing the 
die themselves, or letting the experimenter throw the die. Unsurprisingly, the majority of 
participants (73%, in Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009) choose to roll the die 
themselves (see also Dunn & Wilson, 1990; Grou & Tabak, 2008; Koehler, Gibbs, & 
Hogarth, 1994). However, this bias could again reflect demand characteristics, or a simple 
wish to be entertained or more involved in the experiment, rather than a genuine belief that 
one’s own dice roll is more likely to win (see Koehler et al., 1994).   
Only a small number of studies have examined whether players will actively 
disadvantage themselves to gain illusory control, and the means of disadvantaging the 
participant has been enacted in a number of ways. In Langer’s (1975) original report 
(experiment 3), participants who chose their lottery ticket later rejected an opportunity to 
exchange the ticket for a ticket in a second lottery with a higher chance of winning. In a 
roulette study where participants could use a handbrake device to stop the wheel, participants 
persisted in using the device when losses were punished with electric shocks, and even when 
using the device reduced the objective probability of success (and thus increased their 
probability of receiving a shock; Friedland, Keinan & Regev, 1992). In another study, 
participants were prepared to buy the right to choose bet locations on a roulette wheel, rather 
than betting on random locations (Dixon, Hayes, & Ebbs, 1998). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
these effects are sensitive to the magnitude of the costs involved (Dunn & Wilson, 1990). 
Grou and Tabak (2008) found that most participants (67%) elected to personally roll a die 
when it was free to do so, but only 12% paid a premium for this opportunity. Therefore, the 
evidence for participants actively disadvantaging themselves to exert illusory control is 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 6
mixed. As gambling necessarily involves a monetary wager on an uncertain outcome, it is 
important to understand participants’ willingness to pay money in order to exercise control 
under conditions of chance. Past work has also neglected the question of whether subjective 
and behavioural definitions of illusory control are related. 
 
The present study sought to develop a novel experimental task to distinguish between 
a subjective operationalisation of illusory control based upon confidence ratings, and a 
behavioural definition based upon the participants’ willingness to pay money in order to 
exercise control in a chance situation. Our task presented 13 playing cards face down around 
the perimeter of a circular wheel (see Figure 1), on each trial. A win segment and a loss 
segment (both of variable size) overlaid the cards; participants were told that if the Ace was 
revealed in the win segment, they would win a £1 (approximately $1.50US) prize, and if the 
Ace was revealed in the loss segment, they would lose £1. In this way, participants were 
encouraged to guess the position of the Ace on each trial. In some trials, participants were 
able to enact their guesses by rotating the win and loss segments. This control was either free 
(the ‘Free Spin’ condition), or required the participant to pay a small fee (the ‘Pay to Spin’ 
condition). In a baseline condition, the position of the win and loss segments was fixed (the 
‘No Control’ condition). Confidence ratings were taken on each trial before the cards were 
turned over (which was after subjects made any decision to spin), to index subjective illusory 
control. The behavioural measure of illusory control was defined as the number of ‘Pay to 
Spin’ decisions, demonstrating participants’ willingness to actively disadvantage themselves. 
As the number of wins was pre-specified, each participant’s financial bonus on the task 
dropped in direct proportion to their number of pay decisions. By presenting the three 
conditions in an inter-leaved, multi-shot game, illusory control measures could be calculated 
for each participant. As previous studies have relied upon either single-shot, between-groups 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 7
designs (Friedland et al., 1992; Grou & Tabak, 2008; Langer, 1975) or small sample sizes (n 
= 5; Dixon et al., 1998), the systematic investigation of individual differences has not been 
possible.  
In light of these individual difference metrics, our second aim was to examine how 
illusory control is related to sense of agency. Sense of agency refers to our experience of 
control over our environment (Moore, Middleton, Haggard, & Fletcher, 2012). Recently, a 
distinction has been proposed between implicit and explicit aspects of the sense of agency 
(Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Moore et al., 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). 
Explicit agency refers to reflective, direct attributions of one’s control over an event; for 
example, assessed by a subjective ratings of control on a Contingency Judgment task (Alloy 
& Abramson, 1979). In contrast, implicit agency refers to a pre-reflective feeling of agency, 
typically measured by perceptual differences in reaction times between events that were self-
generated versus externally generated. The ‘intentional binding’ effect provides an 
established measure of implicit agency, referring to the subjective compression of time when 
a self-initiated action (e.g. a button press) gives rise to an outcome (e.g. a tone presented 
250ms later; Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Moore & Obhi, 
2012). Changes in the magnitude of intentional binding are thought to indicate changes in the 
pre-reflective experience of control over actions and their outcomes (Moore et al., 2012).  
How are individual differences in these implicit and explicit aspects of the sense of 
agency related to the illusion of control? Illusory control may be conceptualised as the faulty 
experience of agency in a non-contingent (i.e. chance) environment. This could arise either as 
a consequence of a reflective attributional process (explicit agency) and/or a distorted 
perceptual experience of one’s control (implicit agency). Some work has suggested that there 
is a link between illusory control and reflective attributional processes. Pathological gamblers 
show elevated scores on questionnaire measures of illusory control (Raylu & Oei, 2004; 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 8
Steenbergh, Meyers, May, & Whelan, 2002), and were recently found to make greater 
overestimations of control (relative to a healthy comparison group) on a Contingency 
Judgment task (Orgaz, Estévez, & Matute, 2013). In the classic version of this paradigm, the 
participant must decide on each trial whether or not to press a button (the action) in order to 
illuminate a lightbulb (the outcome; Alloy & Abramson, 1979). After a block of trials, 
participants rate their degree of control over the lightbulb illuminating. Under conditions of 
zero contingency, healthy participants typically overestimate their level of control, and 
particularly when the positive outcomes are frequent and are rewarded (e.g. by winning 
money). The observation that this bias was exaggerated in pathological gamblers was 
interpreted by Orgaz et al. (2013) as evidence that the illusion of control is a distributed, 
domain-general trait that conveys risk of gambling problems, although their study did not 
employ any direct measures of illusory control in a gambling context.  
Other work indicates a link with measures of implicit agency. The intentional binding 
procedure is sensitive to disordered experiences of control in some clinical groups. For 
example, schizophrenia is associated with an abnormal sense of agency (e.g. passivity 
experiences) and exaggerated intentional binding (Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, 
Jeannerod, & Franck, 2003; Voss et al., 2010). In patients with Parkinson’s disease, 
intentional binding was also sensitive to dopamine manipulation (via medication withdrawal; 
Moore et al., 2010). Dopamine is intimately linked to addictive disorders including 
pathological gambling (Boileau et al., 2013). Moore et al. (2010) hypothesised that an 
increased implicit sense of agency is a risk factor for impulse control disorders including 
pathological gambling, which are often seen as a side effect of dopaminergic medication in 
Parkinson’s Disease.   
To formally characterise these relationships between the illusion of control and the 
explicit and implicit aspects of sense of agency, we administered a Contingency Judgment 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 9
task (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) and the Intentional Binding task (Haggard et al., 2002), 
alongside our novel card-guessing task of illusory control. We also included a Locus of 
Control questionnaire (Levenson, 1973) to assess dispositional beliefs in the ability to 
influence one’s environment (Rotter, 1966). Our hypotheses were as follows. First, at a 
descriptive level, we expected participants to make Pay to Spin decisions on the card-
guessing task, consistent with a definition of illusory control that requires participants to 
disadvantage themselves. Second, we predicted that confidence ratings on the card-guessing 
task would be higher on trials where participants chose to spin the wheel, compared to the No 
Control baseline condition. Third, we predicted that the cost involved (Free Spin, Pay to 
Spin), the probabilities of winning and losing (which were orthogonalised), and the 
participants’ confidence on each trial would influence participants’ choice to spin (see 
Footnote 2). Finally, we hypothesised that Pay to Spin decisions and confidence ratings on 
the card-guessing task would be correlated with internal Locus of Control (i.e. the belief that 
life events are determined by ones behaviour, rather than a result of external factors), over-
estimations of control on the Contingency Judgment task, and the magnitude of the 
intentional binding effect.  
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate student participants from the University of Cambridge (n = 78, 52.6% 
male, age range: 18 – 23 years) were recruited via poster and email advertisements. 
Approximately a quarter (26.9%, n = 21) of participants reported that they had gambled at 
least once within the past 12 months. The Problem Gambling Severity Index (Ferris & 
Wynne, 2001) indicated that our participants were predominantly non-problem gamblers 
(score = 0, n = 52, 66.7%) or ‘low-risk’ gamblers (score = 1-2, n = 20, 25.6%), with a small 
number of ‘moderate-risk’ gamblers (score = 3-7, n = 6, 7.7%). No participants were 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 10
classified as ‘probable problem gamblers’ (score > 7). Self-reported games of choice in the 
subgroup who gambled were mostly poker and sports betting. The study was approved by the 
University of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee.  
Participants completed the card-guessing task, the Contingency Judgment task, and 
the Intentional Binding task on a 15 inch Acer laptop, in a counterbalanced order. Testing 
sessions lasted approximately 1 hour. Participants received £5 for their participation, in 
addition to a financial bonus based on their performance on the card-guessing task. The raw 
data is available on Dspace, the University of Cambridge archiving repository. 
Materials 
Card-guessing task: The task was programmed using Visual Basic Software (see 
Figure 1, and for participant instructions, see Appendix. On each trial, a circular table with 
wood grain finish was displayed on a green background. A ‘deal’ button was displayed to the 
right of the table. Upon clicking ‘deal’ on each trial, 13 cards (the full suit of hearts) were 
dealt face down around the perimeter of the table. Two transparent coloured segments 
overlaid the cards: a white ‘win’ segment and a red ‘loss’ segment. The size of the two 
segments varied (independently of one another) between trials, with each covering 1, 3 or 5 
cards1. Each of the nine possible combinations of win and loss probability segment sizes was 
presented within each condition. The win and loss areas did not overlap and were separated 
by at least one card. Participants were instructed that the aim of the game was to find the Ace 
on each trial. If the Ace fell within the win segment, they would win £1; if the Ace lay within 
the loss segment they would lose £1, and if the Ace was revealed outside the two coloured 
zones, there was no financial outcome.  
                                                        
1 The primary reason for varying the segment sizes was to encourage participants to vary 
their confidence ratings on a trial-to-trial basis, which we reasoned might enhance any 
differences between the 3 Control conditions. It is an empirical question to what extent the 
illusion of control varies across different probabilities of winning or losing (c.f. Gino et al., 
2011) but we did not have an a priori prediction about the nature or direction of any such 
effect. 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 11
(Figure 1 about here) 
Three types of trial were presented in a randomised order. In the baseline No Control 
condition, the position of the win and loss segments were fixed, and participants could only 
select the ‘Reveal Cards’ button. On Free Spin trials, participants could rotate the win and 
loss segments, using two buttons labelled with clockwise- and anticlockwise- pointing 
arrows. When either button was clicked, both segments rotated, one card at a time. The 
participant clicked a third button, ‘Reveal Cards’, when the desired configuration was 
reached. On Pay to Spin trials, participants first selected between two options, ‘Reveal Cards’ 
or ‘Enable Spin (10 pence)’. If the participant selected ‘Reveal Cards’, the trial proceeded as 
for the No Control condition, whereas if the participant selected ‘Enable Spin’, 10 pence was 
deducted from the participant’s balance, and the two arrows were enabled as in the Free Spin 
condition. On every trial, participants gave an on-screen confidence rating (“How confident 
are you of winning?” from ‘Not at all’ (0) to ‘Extremely’ (100)) after selecting ‘Reveal 
Cards’. When the participant submitted his/her confidence rating, the 13 cards were turned 
over, revealing the Ace location, and any feedback was presented centrally (‘Win £1’ or 
‘Lose £1’ for 2 seconds, with no financial feedback presented if the Ace was outside the two 
coloured zones). There was 0.5 second inter-trial interval before the next trial.  
Participants played 54 trials (18 trials per condition) in a single block that took 
approximately 20 minutes to complete. Participants were provided with a £3 endowment at 
the start of the task. Given that the wins and losses were pre-specified, their financial bonus 
on completion varied from £1.40 to £3, as a direct function of the number of trials in which 
they paid to spin.  
A debrief questionnaire was administered after the card-guessing task to assess 
several factors linked to illusory control: (1) “How much skill do you think was involved in 
winning the task?” (1 = ‘No skill’ to 5 = ‘A lot of skill’), (2) “How much additional control 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 12
do you think moving the win section gave you?” (1 = ‘No more control’ to 5 = ‘A lot more 
control’), (3) “Did you use the previous locations of the ace to help you choose whether to 
move the win section?” (1 = ‘Not at all’ to 5 = ‘Always’), (4) “Did your previous wins or 
losses affect your confidence on the next trial?” (1 = ‘Not at all’ to 5 = ‘Always’) (5) “Did 
moving the win segment affect your confidence of winning?” (1 = ‘Not at all’ to 5 = 
‘Always’). 
Contingency Judgment task: We used a computerised version of the classic Alloy 
and Abramson (1979) task. Participants were instructed that their goal was to illuminate a 
light bulb as often as possible (see Gillan et al., 2014), using the space bar. On each trial, the 
participant was presented with an unlit light bulb, and they had 1.5 seconds to decide whether 
or not to make the action. The light bulb would then either illuminate or fail to illuminate, 
with auditory feedback. At the end of each block of 40 trials, participants rated their degree 
of control over the lightbulb, on a scale from 0 (no control) to 100 (complete control). The 
true contingency between pressing the spacebar and the illumination of the light bulb was 
fixed at zero, such that control ratings above 0 represent an overestimation of control. 
Participants took 15 minutes to complete 4 blocks of the task, in a 2 x 2 design with 
counter-balanced order. The frequency with which the lightbulb illuminated was set at either 
25% (low reinforcement) or 75% (high reinforcement). Reinforcement valence was also 
manipulated between a win condition (where each illumination won 5 pence) and a loss 
condition (where failures to illuminate were penalised with a 5 pence loss). Thus, the four 
conditions were: 75% Win, 75% Loss, 25% Win and 25% Loss. Based on prior work, we 
expected overestimations of control to be greatest in the win condition with the high 
reinforcement rate (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Gillan et al., 2014). We also measured the 
number of space bar presses, as participants who respond more often tend to provide greater 
overestimations of control (Hannah & Beneteau, 2009; Matute, 1996).  
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 13
Intentional Binding task (Haggard et al., 2002): This task involved 4 conditions (20 
trials per condition, counterbalanced) where the participant judged the timing of either an 
action (key press) or a tone. For each trial, a ‘Libet clock’ (see Libet, Gleason, Wright, & 
Pearl, 1983) was presented to the participant onscreen, with a clock hand rotating at one 
revolution every 2560ms. In two operant conditions, the participant was required to make a 
key press at the time of their own choosing, and the key press produced a tone after a 250ms 
delay. After the tone, the clock hand continued to rotate for a random period of time (between 
1500ms-2500ms). When the hand stopped rotating, the participant was prompted to estimate 
either the time of their key press (in the Operant Action condition) or the time of the tone (in 
the Operant Tone condition). In two baseline conditions, the participant estimated the time of 
their key press (in absence of a tone; the Baseline Action condition) or the time of a 
computer-generated tone (in absence of a key press; the Baseline Tone condition). The 
participants submitted their timing judgments via an on-screen text box. The task took 15 
minutes to complete.  
We calculated participants’ timing judgment errors as the difference between their 
perceived time of an event (i.e. key press or tone) and the actual time of the event. In each 
case, a positive value indicates that the event was perceived as occurring later than it actually 
occurred, and a negative value indicates that the event was perceived as occurring earlier in 
time than the actual event. Intentional binding occurs when the perceived onset of an operant 
action is shifted forward in time and the perceived onset of the resultant tone is shifted 
backwards in time compared to baseline judgments of the action and tone occurrences, 
respectively (Haggard et al., 2002). This score was calculated by subtracting the perceptual 
shift for action judgments (judgment error in Operant Action minus the judgment error in 
Baseline Action) from the perceptual shift for tone judgments (judgment error in Operant 
Tone minus the judgment error in Baseline Tone).  
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 14
Levenson’s Locus of Control Scale (Levenson, 1973): This 24 item questionnaire to 
assess participants’ perceived ability to control their environment. The scale comprises three 
subscales measuring internal locus of control (sample M = 33.6, SD = 5.60), external locus 
of control by powerful others (M = 19.2, SD = 6.85), and external locus of control by chance 
(M = 18.8, SD = 6.45).   
Statistical Analysis  
Data were analysed using R (R Core Team, Vienna, Austria), Statistical Analysis 
Software (SAS) University Edition (SAS Institute Inc, Cary, NC) and SPSS Statistics 
(Version 22, IBM Corp, Armonk, NY). For the analysis of the card-guessing task, we used 
multi-level regression, where every trial from each subject is entered into a regression model. 
Using this approach, the correlation between trials within a subject is accounted for at one 
level of the model, and experimental effects of interest are investigated at the second level of 
the model. Three regression models were carried out on these trial-by-trial data, using the 
GENMOD procedure in SAS. The first model investigated predictors of Confidence; the 
second model sought to predict the likelihood of spinning2, only considering the Free and Pay 
to Spin conditions, and the third model obtained a Subjective Illusory Control measure for 
each participant. For the first two models, we further subdivided Pay to Spin and Free Spin 
trials based on whether or not they chose to Spin (Free / Spin, Free / No Spin, Pay / Spin, Pay 
/ No Spin). Inspection of the data for the task revealed that seven participants never spun in 
any condition, and these participants were excluded from the regression models. 
 Model 1: Confidence. To investigate predictors of Confidence across all task 
conditions, we used a fixed-effect approach to model the within subject correlations. Within a 
                                                        
2 We note that models 1 and 2 are not independent, and actually address related questions: 
model 1 examines spin condition as a predictor of confidence, and model 2 includes 
confidence as a predictor of likelihood of spinning. Critically, model 1 benefits from the No 
Control baseline condition; as this condition involves no actual decision, those data were 
excluded in model 2. Conversely, only model 2 directly tests spin ‘cost’ (free or pay) as a 
factor influencing whether or not participants exercised control.   
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 15
fixed-effects model each participant acts as their own control, thereby circumventing any bias 
that could result from a participant’s spin decisions dictating the proportion of their trials that 
contribute each condition. To achieve this, Subject was entered into the model as a 
categorical predictor. Win and Loss probability were entered as linear predictors in the 
model. The five levels of Spin conditions (No Control, Free / Spin, Free / No Spin, Pay / 
Spin, Pay / No Spin) were entered as a single categorical predictor, with No Control as the 
reference condition. Predicted values were calculated for each spin condition for every 
participant (with Win and Loss probability held constant), and these values were averaged for 
graphing the model’s predicted data, independent of whether or not participants experienced 
each trial type. To plot the observed data, a mean Confidence score was also calculated for 
every trial type that a participant experienced, and averaged across participants. These 
observed averages collapsed across all Win and Loss probabilities, to include as much raw 
data as possible. Standard errors were calculated for the observed data using a method that 
removes between-subject variance in within-subject designs (Cousineau & O’Brien, 2014). 
To plot the effects of Win and Loss probabilities, the predicted values and observed values 
were calculated the same way, this time holding Spin Condition constant at the level of No 
Control. 
Model 2: Spin Probability. On Free Spin and Pay to Spin trials, we investigated 
predictors of spin decisions. We used Generalised Estimating Equation (GEE) to model the 
within subject correlations, using a logit link function given that the outcome variable (Spin 
or No Spin) was binary. GEE is a powerful way of analysing such data in balanced designs 
(i.e. where all participants contribute equally to all conditions); this is appropriate for this 
model (but not models 1 and 3) as spin decision is the outcome variable rather than a 
predictor. The predictor variables that were considered for inclusion in the model were Spin 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 16
Condition (Free Spin or Pay to Spin), Confidence3, Win Probability, and Loss Probability, 
and the interactions between these predictors. Confidence was mean-centred for each subject 
to achieve parity with the fixed-effects model. Confidence and Win Probability were initially 
entered into the same model, but neither variable was significant. Win Probability was the 
least significant predictor (Win Probability, z = 0.56 versus Confidence, z = 1.38) and the 
quasi-likelihood information criterion was lower when Confidence was included in the model 
compared to Win Probability. Therefore, Win Probability was removed from the analysis and 
Confidence was selected for inclusion. For plotting we calculated the predicted spin 
probability at different levels of Confidence, and the upper and lower 95% confidence limits 
of these predictions.  
Model 3: Subjective Illusory Control. To derive an individual difference measure of 
Subjective Illusory Control we looked at the effect of exercising illusory control on 
confidence ratings. First, we collapsed the Free / Spin and Pay / Spin trials. A binary 
predictor representing the collapsed Spin trials versus No Control trials was entered into a 
fixed-effects model as an interaction with the categorical Subject predictor. In addition to this 
interaction term, Win and Loss probability were entered as linear predictors. This model 
resulted in a beta value for each subject at the level of No Control, and a beta value for each 
subject at the level of Spin. The difference between these two beta values indicated the 
change in Confidence when a participant spun versus baseline, providing a measure of 
Subjective Illusory Control adjusting for the different distributions of Win and Loss 
probabilities amongst these conditions. 
For each of the models on the card-guessing task, leverage and standardised residuals 
were calculated for each data point to identify cases that had undue influence on each model 
                                                        
3 We note that the confidence rating was taken after the spin decision. By including 
confidence as a predictor of the likelihood of spinning, we do not make any assumptions 
about the temporal order of these cognitions; we are testing the simple prediction that 
decisions to exercise control will be associated with higher levels of confidence.   
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 17
or where the model fit was poor. Unless stated otherwise, the assumptions of each model was 
met, and the model was reliable and was not unduly influenced by any cases. Similarly, 
unless otherwise stated, assumption of the subsequent repeated measures ANOVAs and 
correlation analyses were also met (i.e. normality and sphericity). 
Results 
Card-guessing task: In the ‘Pay to Spin’ condition, participants paid to rotate the 
wheel on 19.4% (SD = 22.8) of trials on average (see Table 1). More than half of our 
participants (50 of 78, 64.1%) paid to rotate the wheel on at least one Pay to Spin trial, and 28 
participants (35.9%) paid on 5 or more trials. In the Free Spin condition, a large majority of 
participants (69 of 78, 88.5%) rotated the wheel at least once, and 76.9% did so on 5 or more 
trials. This proportion was significantly greater on Free Spin trials compared to Pay to Spin 
trials, t(77) = 12.3, p < .001, dav = 1.46. On trials where participants elected to rotate the 
wheel, there was no difference in the mean number of movements (i.e. button clicks) between 
the Free Spin (M = 4.21, SD = 1.53) and Pay to Spin (M = 4.25, SD = 1.98) trials, t(45) = -
0.12, p = .902. 
(Table 1 about here) 
The analysis of Confidence ratings (model 1) revealed expected effects of Win and 
Loss probability. As the Win probability increased, Confidence ratings increased, and as the 
Loss probability increased, confidence ratings decreased (see Table 2 and Figure 2). 
Compared to the No Control condition, Confidence ratings were higher in the Free / Spin, 
Free / No Spin, and Pay / Spin conditions, but not the Pay / No Spin condition (see Table 2 
and Figure 3). Pairwise contrasts revealed that the difference in confidence between the Free / 
Spin and Free / No Spin conditions was only marginal (x2 (1) = 2.88, p = .090); that is to say, 
the actual decision to rotate the segments did not significantly affect confidence in the free 
condition. However, Confidence was significantly higher in the Pay / Spin condition than the 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 18
Pay / No Spin conditions (x2 (1) = 9.88, p = .002), supporting the notion that illusory control 
is better captured by spin decisions made under conditions of financial cost than tasks where 
control can be exerted at no cost.  
(Table 2 and Figure 2 and 3 about here) 
For the analysis of Spin probability in model 2 (see Figure 4), we observed a 
significant effect of Spin Condition (Free Spin or Pay to Spin) when Confidence was held 
constant at each participants’ mean (β (SE) = 1.87 (0.16), p < .0001, 95% CI = 1.55 - 2.18). 
At this average level of Confidence, the probability of spinning was higher in the Free Spin 
condition than the Pay to Spin condition. In the Pay to Spin condition, as Confidence 
increased, the probability of Spinning increased (β (SE) = 0.012 (0.006), p < .05, 95% CI = 
0.001 - 0.023). However, in the Free Spin condition, probability of spinning was not 
modulated by Confidence (β (SE) = -0.002 (0.004), p = .07, 95% CI = -0.007 - 0.21). This 
effect of Confidence on spinning differed significantly between the Pay to Spin and Free Spin 
trials (Spin condition x Confidence interaction: β (SE) = -0.014 (0.007), p < .05, 95% CI = -
0.027 to -0.001). In model 2, increasing Loss probability also predicted increased likelihood 
of Spinning (β (SE) = 0.08 (0.04), p < .05, 95% CI = 0.004 – 0.16). 
(Figure 4 about here) 
From model 3 we derived a measure of Subjective Illusory Control for each 
participant, controlling for Win and Loss probability, for use in the individual differences 
analyses. For this model, Win probability and Loss probability continued to predict 
Confidence (Win: β (SE) = 9.39 (0.34), p < .0001, 95% CI = 8.72 - 10.06, Loss: β (SE) = -
1.76 (0.34), p < .0001, 95% CI = -2.42 to -1.10).  
Contingency Judgment task: The mean control ratings across the four conditions 
indicated clear overestimations of control: 25% Loss, M = 8.92 (SD = 16.0); 25% Win, M = 
15.1 (SD = 18.2); 75% Loss, M = 34.6 (SD = 33.4); 75% Win, M = 43.1 (SD = 34.1). A 2 x 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 19
2 repeated measures ANOVA tested the effects of Valence (win, loss) and Reinforcement 
Rate (25%, 75%). Participants rated their control significantly higher in the 75% rate 
compared to the 25% rate (main effect, F(1,77) = 68.3, p <.001, ηp2=.47). Participants also 
rated their control as higher in win blocks compared to loss blocks (main effect, F(1,77) = 
12.3, p <.001 ηp2=.14). The Valence x Reinforcement Rate interaction was not significant, 
F(1,77) = 0.37, p = .55.  
The percentage of trials on which participants pressed the space bar ranged from 
51.6% to 55.6% (SD = 16.0 – 22.8%) and did not differ significantly across conditions. For 
the subsequent individual difference analyses, the control ratings across the 4 task conditions 
were averaged to create the Overestimation score (see Table 3). This variable was positively 
correlated with the rate of responding on the task, r = .228, p = .045, consistent with previous 
studies (Hannah & Beneteau, 2009; Matute, 1996). 
Intentional Binding task: We observed a robust perceptual shift in the timing 
estimates consistent with the established intentional binding effect (Haggard et al., 2002). A 2 
x 2 repeated measures ANOVA confirmed a highly significant Condition (baseline, operant) 
x Perceptual Judgment (action, outcome) interaction, F (1,77) = 58.6, p < .001, ηp2 = .43. In 
the Operant Action condition, key presses were perceived later than their actual onsets (M = 
6.48ms, SD = 63.9) whereas in the Baseline Action condition, key presses were perceived 
earlier than their actual onsets (M = -21.2ms, SD = 47.1), t (77) = 4.65, p <.001, d = .550. In 
contrast, in the Operant Tone condition, the tones were perceived earlier than their actual 
onsets (M = -47.9ms, SD = 79.7), whereas in the Baseline Tone condition, tones were 
perceived as later than their actual onsets (M = 8.17ms, SD = 54.2), t(77) = 7.46, p <.001, d 
= .940. Thus, the overall judgments for actions (M = 27.6ms, SD = 16.8) were shifted 
towards the tones, whereas the overall judgments for outcomes were shifted towards the key 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 20
press (M = -56.0ms, SD = 25.5). An overall Intentional Binding score (M = 83.7ms, SD = 
96.6) was calculated from the action binding score minus the outcome binding score.   
Correlations between illusory control and agency: To explore the relationships 
between the three tasks, four composite scores were derived. A behavioural measure of 
illusory control was defined as the proportion of Pay to Spin trials on which the participant 
paid (this variable showed positive skew, but parametric and non-parametric tests yielded 
similar results). Subjective illusory control on the card-guessing task was quantified as the 
change in Confidence when exercising illusory control (derived from model 3 for the card-
guessing task). The Overestimation score from the Contingency Judgment task was used as a 
measure of explicit sense of agency and the overall Intentional Binding score was used as a 
measure of implicit sense of agency. The correlations and mean scores are provided in Table 
3. 
(Table 3 about here) 
A significant positive correlation was found between Proportion Paid on the card-
guessing task, and the Overestimation score on the Contingency Judgment task, r (78) = 0.34, 
p <.010, accounting for 11.7% of the variance (see Figure 5a). The Subjective Illusory 
Control score from the card-guessing task was not significantly associated with the 
Overestimation score. Although a robust Intentional Binding effect was observed in the 
overall sample, Intentional Binding scores did not correlate significantly with Proportion Paid 
(see Figure 5b) or Subjective Illusory Control from the card-guessing task, nor with the 
Overestimation score on the Contingency Judgment task. Using Steiger’s calculation, the 
correlation between Proportion Paid and the Overestimation score was significantly greater 
than the correlation between Proportion Paid and Intentional Binding, ZH = 2.03, p = 0.04.  
 (Figure 5 about here) 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 21
On the Locus of Control scale, there was no significant relationships between the 3 
subscales and the 4 behavioural variables (Internal, r = -0.04 - 0.10, p > .393; Powerful 
Others, r = -0.16 – 0.07, p > .176; Chance, r = - 0.08 – 0.07, p > .471), except for the Locus 
of Control Chance subscale and Subjective Illusory Control, r (71) = 0.25, p = .034. 
Card-guessing task debrief questionnaire: The mean scores on the five debrief 
questions on perceived control were each fairly low. On average, participants perceived that 
little skill was involved in winning the task (question 1: M = 1.83, SD = 1.0), they perceived 
little additional control from rotating the segments (question 2: M = 1.94, SD = 1.07), and 
reported little effect of moving the segments on their confidence (question 5: M = 2.08, SD = 
1.03). Participants did not reliably endorse using the previous Ace locations to influence their 
decisions to pay (question 3: M = 2.22, SD = 1.35) or that previous wins or losses affected 
their confidence (question 4: M = 2.22, SD = 1.30). However, despite these low ratings on 
average, each of these debrief questions was significantly correlated with both the Proportion 
Paid variable (r (78) = 0.45 - 0.57, p < .01) and the Subjective Illusory Control score (r (71) 
= 0.22 – 0.50, p < .05). 
Discussion 
This study developed a novel experimental task to distinguish between two 
operational definitions of illusory control: a subjective component based upon confidence 
ratings, and a behavioural measure based upon the participants’ willingness to pay money in 
order to exercise control in a chance situation. The majority of our participants evidenced at 
least some degree of illusory control on the behavioural measure: two-thirds of our sample 
was prepared to pay a fee to rotate the win and loss segments on at least one trial. But 
importantly, this was a distributed trait: one third of participants paid to spin regularly, on at 
least five occasions, but equally, another third refused to pay at all and were effectively 
immune to the bias (see also Burger, 1986; Koehler et al., 1994). Subjective illusory control 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 22
was also clearly evident, in the elevated confidence scores when participants accepted the 
opportunity to rotate the segments, compared to the No Control baseline. Confidence ratings 
were also sensitive to the size of the win and loss segments, as expected. The subjective and 
behavioural variables were inter-related: in the GEE analysis, participants were more likely to 
rotate the wheel when their confidence was high, and this effect was significantly stronger in 
the Pay to Spin condition relative to the Free Spin condition. Participants who reported higher 
confidence and Pay to Spin decisions also reported more overt beliefs about the level of skill 
and control in the card-guessing task on a retrospective debrief questionnaire. These results 
help to consolidate a disparate literature on illusory control that has used either subjective or 
behavioural measures, showing considerable overlap between the two conceptualisations.  
By employing a multi-shot task to derive measures of the strength of illusory control 
in each participant, we also explored individual differences in relation to two domain-general, 
cognitive measures of agency. The Contingency Judgment task and Intentional Binding task 
were both successful in robustly inducing their respective cognitive biases. On the 
Contingency Judgment task, participants overestimated their degree of control over the 
lightbulb illuminations, and this was strongest in the condition with frequent outcomes that 
were positively valenced. This has been labelled the ‘outcome density effect’ (Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979; Gillan et al., 2014). Participants with higher response rates also reported 
stronger overestimations of control, as observed previously (Hannah & Beneteau, 2009; 
Matute, 1996). On the Intentional Binding task, we observed a substantial compression in the 
subjective passage of time, whereby self-initiated actions were perceived later, and their 
operant outcomes were perceived earlier, relative to baseline judgments of actions and tones 
occurring alone. This created a mean Intentional Binding score of 84ms that is much in 
keeping with earlier papers using this procedure (e.g. Haggard et al., 2002). Notably, these 
two domain-general agency measures were not significantly inter-correlated (r = 0.05), 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 23
consistent with a proposed dichotomy between explicit and implicit aspects of the sense of 
agency (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Moore et al., 2012). Neither of the agency tests was 
related to trait scores on the Locus of Control scale, consistent with the study by Dewey and 
Knoblich, (2014). The only significant relationship for Locus of Control was for the external 
chance subscale against the Subjective Illusory Control parameter. This subscale has been 
highlighted in a previous study in problem gamblers (de Stadelhofen, Aufrère, Besson, & 
Rossier, 2009), and may reflect unusual beliefs in the nature of fate and chance that have 
clear relevance to the illusion of control. We note that the coefficient observed does not 
survive correction for the 3 subscales of the Levenson questionnaire, and that alternative self-
report scales may better capture aspects of self-efficacy associated with gambling illusory 
control (e.g. Paulhus, 1983). 
The proportion of Pay to Spin decisions on the card-guessing task was correlated 
significantly with control overestimations on the Contingency Judgment task. In a formal 
test, this relationship was significantly stronger than the coefficient for the same illusory 
control measure against the intentional binding effect. This relationship links domain-specific 
illusory control in a gambling context to the broader cognitive literature on the ‘sense of 
agency’. More specifically, the willingness to pay in order to exert control in a gambling 
game predicts the tendency to explicitly over-estimate causal associations between random, 
non-contingent events. The Contingency Judgment task was also abstract and did not present 
gambling stimuli, involving only button presses and lightbulb illumination. Our results help 
substantiate a conjecture by Orgaz et al (2013) that the heightened over-estimations of control 
they observed in pathological gamblers performing the Contingency Judgment task reflected 
a dispositional trait of enhanced illusory control. Deficits in explicit agency have further been 
association with delusions (Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & Woodward, 2013), reduced self-
efficacy (Taylor & Brown, 1988) and superstitious beliefs (Rudski, 2001).  
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 24
As illusory control mapped onto explicit judgments of agency, as opposed to feelings 
of agency, our results imply that gambling-related illusory control arises from a reflective 
attributional process, rather than from a distorted perceptual experience of action-outcome 
relationships. Decisions to pay on the card-guessing task are deliberate, goal-directed actions 
that are likely to be moderated by both predictive and inferential beliefs, as well as social and 
contextual cues. These decisions, and confidence ratings, were both sensitive to the outcome 
probabilities in the card-guessing task, although the probability of winning and losing did not 
interact with condition. It is also conceivable that alternative measures of illusory control 
could detect associations with implicit agency. Karsh and Eitam (2015) recently found that 
both implicit and explicit judgments of agency play distinct roles in action selection: implicit 
agency was reflected in the speed of responding, whereas explicit agency predicted which 
action was selected. As the card-guessing task emphasised action selection and not response 
speed, other operationalisations could detect links with intentional binding.  
On the card-guessing task, our participants were significantly more likely to rotate the 
wheel in the Free Spin condition compared to the Pay to Spin condition. This observation -- 
that some individuals will exercise control when there is no cost, but are not willing to 
disadvantage themselves to gain such control -- echoes the findings from Grou and Tabak 
(2008) who used a single-shot, between-subjects design. Naturally, these effects would be 
expected to vary further with the premium size (Dunn & Wilson, 1990), but it was beyond 
the aims of the current study to explore those effects. At the same time, the Condition x 
Confidence interaction in the GEE model indicates that confidence was actually a stronger 
predictor of when participants would exercise control in the Pay to Spin condition, compared 
to the Free Spin condition. Similarly, in the Fixed-Effects Regression, the mere opportunity 
for control, if declined, was not sufficient to reliably increase confidence in the Pay to Spin 
condition. In the Free Spin condition, confidence was boosted by the opportunity to spin, 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 25
regardless of whether participants actually moved the wheel. Overall, two effects are 
apparent here: i) confidence and decision-making were more closely aligned when the 
decision was costly compared to free, and ii) even within a fairly uniform, highly-educated 
sample, illusory control is a distributed, quantitative effect.  
Some limitations should be noted. First, the design of the card-guessing task allowed 
participants to exercise control as often, or as little, as they wished. This was effective in 
detecting individual differences, but complicated task analysis, precluding a straightforward 
analysis of variance approach. It was necessary to distinguish five conditions from the three 
trial-types (e.g. the Pay to Spin condition was further separated into trials where the 
opportunity to spin was accepted versus declined). Seven participants rejected all 
opportunities to rotate the wheel across both Free Spin and Pay to Spin conditions; we could 
not calculate a Subjective Illusory Control score for these participants, who were therefore 
removed from the models for the card-guessing task and the correlations for the Subjective 
Illusory Control parameter. Second, by presenting the three trial-types within a multi-shot 
task, it is possible that the presence of the Free Spin condition may have affected 
participants’ willingness to Pay to Spin on other trials. That said, any such influence would 
be expected to reduce the sensitivity of the Pay to Spin condition and increase Type 2 error 
rather than false positives. Third, our analyses cannot adjudicate on the causal directionality 
between confidence and illusory control decisions: it is possible that decisions to exercise 
control enhanced confidence, or that high confidence (e.g. from a prior success) prompted 
subjects to exercise control. Fourth, within a single experiment we were not able to 
characterise a number of possible moderators, including gender, the nature of the pay-off 
structure, or the precise wording of the task instructions (Presson & Benassi, 1996; Dunn & 
Wilson 1990). The instructions for the card-guessing task sought to create an ambiguous 
environment in order to maximise individual differences, rather than emphasising either 
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ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 26
chance or skill as the key determinant of success. Finally, our findings from well-educated 
undergraduate sample may not generalise to illusory control in either regular or problem 
gamblers, and both groups represent fruitful targets for further investigation.  
We believe our results have a number of theoretical and practical implications. The 
distributed nature of illusory control in a healthy, well-educated sample highlights how this 
long-standing psychological bias is certainly not restricted to individuals with gambling 
problems, but equally, it does not appear to reflect a human universal; roughly one-third of 
our participants fully refused to pay to exercise irrelevant control. Investigating the 
psychological characteristics of these ‘resilient’ individuals may shed light on ways of 
attenuating illusory control in the larger demographic who are susceptible to the bias. From a 
methodological perspective, the dissociations apparent in our data between confidence ratings 
and payment behaviour are problematic for the proposal that ‘post-decision wagering’ can 
serve as a proxy for decision confidence (Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007). From the 
perspective of gambling policy, illusory control can be elicited within gambling games in a 
myriad of different ways: for example, lottery players like to choose their favourite numbers 
(Hardoon, Baboushkin, Derevensky, & Gupta, 2001), and modern slot machines often 
include a stopping device to brake the spinning reels (Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005). Our data 
support the inclusion of an ‘illusory control’ variable in systems currently in development for 
gauging the likely public harms of any specific (e.g. new) form of gambling (e.g. Meyer, 
Fiebig, Häfeli, & Mörsen, 2011). Finally, our observed association between gambling-related 
illusory control and the Contingency Judgment task may be useful for gambling researchers, 
as a means of assessing control perceptions with a task that does not involve direct gambling 
cues, which can induce cravings and relapse in treatment-seeking individuals (Hanss, 
Mentzoni, Griffiths, & Pallesen, 2015). 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. A full trial sequence for the gambling task; win probability is depicted in white and 
loss probability is depicted in red.  
Figure 2. Modulation of Confidence ratings as a function of a) Win probability and b) Loss 
probability within No Control trials.  Diamond markers indicate the mean and standard error 
of the observed data, lines indicate the values of Confidence predicted by the model. 
Figure 3. Observed and predicted Confidence across the different card-guessing task 
conditions. Diamond markers indicate the mean and standard error of the observed data, 
black circles indicate the predicted values of Confidence. Predictions are calculated with Win 
and Loss probability held constant covering 3 cards. The observed discrepancy between the 
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predicted and observed values is likely due to the bias introduced in the observed data due the 
systematic differences in Win and Loss probabilities between Spin and No Spin trials in the 
task. 
 
Figure 4. Effect of Confidence and Spin Condition (Free Spin, Pay to Spin) on the 
probability of spinning. Shaded area indicates 95% confidence limits. 
 
Figure 5. The correlation between Proportion Paid and (a) the Contingency Judgment task 
and (b) the Intentional Binding task. 
 
Appendix 
 
Instructions for the novel card-guessing task. 
 
These instructions were presented to the participant on a printed sheet, which was also read 
aloud by the experimenter: 
 
You’re about to play a game which contains elements of gambling. You will be playing for 
real money that you will be awarded at the end, as a bonus payment. 
 
You will be shown a table with 13 cards (the suit of Hearts) arranged face down in a wheel. 
The aim of this game is to find the Ace in these cards. Two segments overlay the cards: a 
white “win” segment and a red “lose” segment. The size of these segments will vary between 
trials. If the Ace lies within the “win” segment you will win £1, however if the Ace lies 
within the “lose” segment you will lose £1. If the Ace is within neither of these segments, 
you will neither win nor lose any money. 
 
On some trials, you will be given the option to choose the position of the “win” and “lose” 
segments. If this is the case, the onscreen arrows will be green. Otherwise, they will be 
greyed out and the computer will choose the position of the segments. Sometimes it will be 
free to move the segments and sometimes you will have to pay a small amount (10p) to 
enable the rotation. If you decide to rotate the wheel, click on the green arrows, which will 
rotate the wheel one card at a time, until you are happy with your choice.  
 
Before the cards are revealed, you will be asked how confident you are of a win. You can 
indicate this, using a sliding scale, with the mouse. Click “OK” when you are happy with 
your answer. The cards will then flip over, revealing where the Ace is and whether you have 
won or lost. The computer will keep track of your balance and it will be displayed at the end. 
 
We will give you £3 to play the game, in addition to the £5 that you have guaranteed for 
turning up. 
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Table 1 
Means and standard deviations for the primary variables on the card-guessing task  
 
Variable      No Control  Free Spin  Pay to Spin 
Decision to spin (max 18)  --  10.5 (5.94)  3.41 (4.15)  
Movements per trial   --  4.21 (1.53)  4.25 (1.98) 
Confidence rating      23.0 (12.9)        25.9 (15.1)  24.1 (14.6)  
Note. NC = No Control; FS = Free Spin; PS = Pay to Spin; Decision to Spin = number of 
trials in which participants chose to move the win/loss segments 
 
Table 2 
Predictors of confidence ratings in the card-guessing task 
 
 β (SE)  Confidence Limits (95%) 
Win Probability     9.57 (0.27) *** 9.06, 10.10 
Loss Probability 
 
-1.81 (0.27) *** -2.33, 1.29 
Free / No Spin  2.09 (0.75) ** 0.62, 3.57 
Free / Spin 3.48 (0.61) *** 2.29, 4.68 
Pay / No Spin 0.58 (0.57) -0.53, 1.70 
Pay / Spin 3.49 (0.92) *** 1.69, 5.30 
All levels of Free and Pay conditions were compared to the No Control baseline. SE = 
standard error. *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01. Subject was also entered as a categorical 
predictor but the individual beta values are not reported due to their arbitrary nature (derived 
from comparison to the first subject) 
 
Table 3 
Correlations (Pearson’s r) between the card-guessing task and the sense of agency tasks  
 
Variables      M SD 1 2 3 4   
1 Proportion Paid       - 0.17 0.34** 0.03  
2. Subjective Illusory Control   2.98 8.11  - 0.07 0.08 
3. Overestimation of Control score  25.4 18.7   - 0.05 
4. Intentional Binding score (ms)  83.7 96.6    -  
Note. Proportion paid = proportion of Pay to Spin trials on which the participant paid; 
Subjective Illusory Control was derived from model 3 for the card-guessing task (score range 
= -100 to +100); Overestimation of Control score from the Contingency Judgment task.** 
p<.01 
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Running head: ILLUSION OF CONTROL AND AGENCY 
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